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9 November 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

**SUBJECT:** Third DoD Worldwide Intelligence Production Management Conference, 25-29 October 1965

1. The subject conference, to which CIA was invited to send an observer, was sponsored by the DIA and included representatives from the Unified and Specified (US) Commands for the purpose of discussing the worldwide production of basic intelligence in the Department of Defense. Summarized below are the highlights of the conference, but I have requested, and believe I'll receive, verbatim texts of the papers presented which could be made available to those interested.


2. The dominant theme of the conference, espoused by DIA, was the necessity for sound management concepts in the production of intelligence. It was made clear, however, that DIA cannot itself direct the intelligence effort of the commands, that the tasking of production must be by mutual agreement. The worldwide coordination of DoD intelligence programs is seen as the first step toward achieving a goal of overall Government-wide management of intelligence production to include CIA.

a. Defense Intelligence Planning - DIA planning for intelligence collection and production is related to overall DoD planning, particularly the Joint Strategic Plan of the JCS. It was frankly stated that the essence of the plan is to try to keep the Joint Chiefs in charge of military requirements and to assure that DoD requirements will be part of national requirements and expressed in military terms rather than be imposed by the DCI. In response to some command skepticism regarding the plan's role versus that of the DCI and USIB, DIA said that by being first with a plan it expects to influence any subsequent national plan.

The framework for DIA planning is the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP) which embraces all intelligence

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facets of the DoD, excluding NSA, and involves over 160 units or programs. Its principal purpose is to focus a review of all intelligence activities and resources and to relate this to effectiveness. Specifically cited as included in the CIP were Collection; Processing and Production; Mapping, Charting and Geodesy; Intelligence Data Handling System; Counterintelligence, Research and Development; and Departmental Intelligence Activities. It also includes the Defense SSO System which is centrally managed by DIA and eventually is expected to be merged with NSA's CRITICOM. For FY 67, the total resources included in the CIP are about 746 million dollars and 53,000 people. Planning for the CIP includes guidance documents from DIA, internal reviews of proposed programs and submission to OSD for approval. A key element in the cycle is the DoD Review Group chaired by DIA and including representatives from the Bureau of the Budget and CIA.

b. Country Studies - A recurring point of discussion during the conference was the production of country studies. In its presentation on the NIS General Survey, DIA urged that the Survey, together with the NIS Basic Intelligence Feedback, be used by the Commands to satisfy the requirement for country studies on their area of responsibility. Some of the Commands, most notably SOUTHCOM (Canal Zone), were insistent, however, that each Command be permitted to produce its own studies to meet its special requirements as well as for training purposes. DIA, not in a position to direct the Commands, urged that they look to satisfaction of its overall and detailed operational requirements in the "package concept" -- the NIS General Survey plus supplementary studies on Urban Areas, Transportation, etc. In response to a strong argument from SOUTHCOM in favor of its country studies, General Maples pointed out that an examination of one of these studies showed that 85% of it was borrowed from the NIS General Survey. Somewhat weakened in its resolve, DIA then stressed that at least the Commands should not produce country studies on areas outside of their responsibility without first coordinating with the appropriate Command.

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e. Plans for Intelligence Production - Throughout the Conference, a number of papers were read presenting DIA plans for the production of a wide span of basic intelligence with the objective of assuring Command knowledge of DIA thinking and soliciting Command comment.

(1) Urban Area Intelligence - Urban Area Studies are highly detailed town plans designed to meet earlier command objections on the lack of such detail and will be prepared under worldwide management if the Commands agree. As a "complete saturation" study, it is consistent with desired DIA emphasis on tactical type of intelligence. The Commands were asked to consider how they would feel about DIA ceasing the production of the Urban Areas portion of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) on the grounds that this NIS is too "strategic oriented" to meet the requirements of the Commands. DIA maintained that the published NIS on this subject would provide a sufficient base for many years and that cessation of scheduled production would free DIA to do its tactical urban studies. [redacted] (Conference Chairman and Chief of the DIA Production Management Staff) indicated that DIA did have a commitment to the NIS Program, but was anxious to get more mileage out of the DIA capability.

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(2) Terrain Intelligence - DIA proposes "streamlining" the Topography Section of the NIS by eliminating all textual material and relying more on tables and some additional maps. This proposal will be forwarded to the Commands for their consideration. DIA would then produce a Standard Terrain Study to meet the current needs of the Commands; this terrain analysis would be broad in scope and consist of topical and evaluative components.

(3) Medical Intelligence - DIA has stimulated the creation of a Medical Board to iron out DoD dissatisfaction with medical intelligence. DIA is now producing Health and Sanitation Studies which are considered to be "strategic" publications but operationally useful. These studies purportedly are in more depth than their NIS counterpart and include more medical intelligence and are to be produced at the rate of two per month. The Commands

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had seen the prototype publications and believed that they were needed and in sufficient detail for their purposes. DIA intends to explore the possibility of eliminating the NIS Health and Sanitation units as "unnecessary duplication."

(4) Evasion and Escape - DIA plans to produce 36 Safe Area Descriptions, hoping that the Commands ultimately will share the production effort. In addition, it will do Escape and Evasion Country Studies in response to Command identification of over 100 countries requiring such studies. Only two of these annually are being produced now but DIA will simplify the format and increase publication.

(5) Coasts and Landing Beaches - DIA was interested in reaction of the Commands to cessation of the Amphibious Operations Studies (AOS) in favor of an automated file which would be more detailed than the AOS. The Commands generally agreed to this file but wanted the AOS continued until automation is completed. DIA then proposed to simplify the AOS format and eliminate existing duplication. The NIS unit on Coasts and Landing Beaches was cited as geared to the high-level planner and for which DIA would propose a revised format, reduced text, and a print-out of automated beach table information.

(6) Meteorological Intelligence - DIA is sending a prototype of an "improved" NIS unit on Weather and Climate unit to the Commands for their comment. DIA would change the outline of this NIS to avoid what it considers excessive textual detail and reduce by half the countries now covered. A single volume covering several contiguous countries is contemplated and the Upper Air would be on a hemisphere basis. DIA proposed that the NIS unit be aimed at weather officers and be unclassified.

(7) Port Study - Twenty-four Port Studies are to be produced per year and the Commands may eventually be asked to contribute their capability for their production. They are now planned to coincide with the NIS schedule in order to save research effort.

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(8) Transportation - Transportation Guides, one each on Railway, Inland Waterways and Highways are being produced on a worldwide basis. They are to be produced by the MIS Commands with DIA support as required. The Guides purportedly are for operational utilization and, therefore, more detailed than the corresponding MIS sections. Also, to be produced are Index of Communications studies which analyze the capability of transportation facilities in a sustained resupply situation.

(9) Telecommunications - DIA wants to prepare publications combining the best features of the MIS Telecommunications Section with more detailed information for operational purposes. Three separate publications are contemplated: A "Foreign Telecommunications Facilities" will pick up where the MIS stops and will not be a duplication; it would be produced by the Commands. DIA would produce "Foreign Telecommunications Systems" on large world areas and also two maps -- a Global Telecommunications Map and one on Worldwide Frequency Allocations. The Commands indicated a need for such production but questioned whether the Commands have the capability to produce the volumes on Telecommunications Facilities.


(10) Petroleum - A joint DIA-Command effort is contemplated to produce "Foreign Petroleum Data." This publication would include a brief textual summary and tables to show the supply situation and maps indicating refineries, pipelines and storage facilities. The counterpart MIS unit is regarded as "too economic oriented" for military use. The Commands were not enthusiastic over the proposed publication, some believing that it could not be dynamic or current enough and others believing that such information could be included in the LOC studies.

(11) Army Material Production and Factories - This publication would show production of armaments and material and detailed data on the factories. A question was raised as to whether this would duplicate CIA publications but DIA stated that such production was clearly a DIA responsibility.

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(12) Aircraft and Missiles - A publication on each is planned which would include a summary, plant data and statistical tables. There would be two volumes, one on the Communist countries and one on the Free World.

(13) Foreign Military Assistance - Requested by ISA, or DoD, this publication would include (by donor country) a summary of military assistance, a summary of military personnel trained in Communist countries and military assistance by recipient countries.



d. Unified & Specified Command Reports -

(1) EUCOM - The relationships with NATO and the Command's dual mission as well as the diverse missions of the three service components were cited as unique and having an influence on intelligence management problems. This unified command produces very little basic intelligence, leaving it to the component commands. EUCOM believes DIA should (a) coordinate the intelligence of all US Commands, (b) establish uniform standards for production disseminated outside of a command and (c) monitor the publications. On the other hand, EUCOM

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believes it should (a) determine production requirements and capability and produce accordingly, leaving to DIA the tasks the Command cannot do, (b) devise a production plan which would assign tasks and responsibilities. In the ensuing discussion, CINCLANT also voiced an objection to DIA assigning production tasks. There was general agreement on the necessity for an authoritative reason for intelligence production, whether command or DIA produced, in the face of Bureau of Budget queries.

(2) PACOM - This Command has appointed an intelligence production manager and organized a board of review, which includes the components, to examine PACOM production with a view to eliminating duplication. The NIS General Survey and Basic Intelligence Factbook is being used as DIA suggested and has resulted in the cancellation of four Basic Intelligence Studies (country handbook). PACOM did raise the question of duplication between the DIA proposed Transportation Guides and the Lines of Communication studies of U. S. Army, Pacific. It also cited the possible conflict between the fixed requirements of the Command and worldwide intelligence requirements.

(3) SOUTHCOM - The Command is active in the production of basic intelligence and stoutly defends its product. These include: (a) Who's Who, (b) Tacts, (c) Special maps, (d) Post Studies, and (e) Country Studies. The latter is produced by the components on each of the Latin America countries within the Command's jurisdiction and pulled together by SOUTHCOM J-2. A strong argument was made for this one volume document over the "package" concept proposed by DIA.

(4) SETHCOM - This Command also produces a Country Review which it regards as tactically oriented, not strategic as in the NIS General Survey. It defended some duplication as warranted if the product is tailored to command requirements and utilizes existing intelligence production. SETHCOM expressed a strong requirement for Washington-produced strategic studies such as the NIS unit on Health and Sanitation and recommended against any dilution of this type of intelligence by too much "streamlining."

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e. Multi-Sensory Imagery -

(1) In the context of a Bureau of Budget letter regarding Photo Interpretation responsibilities in the Intelligence Community, a study is underway on PI inventory, resources, tasking, coordination of ADP and duplication. DIA plans an independent report to the Secretary of Defense as well as a joint DoD-CIA report. In preparation for this report, a survey will be disseminated to the Commands asking for a PI time study, publication, R&D, ADP equipment and an evaluation of strengths and weaknesses. The Commands were urged not to view this as "just another survey", but to give it their thoughtful attention.

(2) An Advanced Multi-Sensor School has been established to centralize DoD training in interpretation, laser, infra red etc. It will be located at Offutt Air Force Base because of the presence of appropriate supporting elements of SAC.

(3) DIA maintained that, in contrast to fast read-out of photography at NPIC, the DIA PI Unit works on detailed read-out and analysis.

f. Miscellaneous

(1) Reorganization of MACV - Formerly, military intelligence on South Vietnam was largely advisory, a small staff and ineffective. An Intelligence Division has now been created as well as an Intelligence Center with a combined U.S.-Vietnam Staff. These people do area analysis, OB, targetting, etc. Intelligence detachments are now assigned to each of the South Vietnam Corps. The full and effective capability of these detachments is expected by January or February 1966. The MACV representative also emphasized the need for more and better terrain analysis.

(2) Electronic Order of Battle - In response to JCS instruction, an apparently major effort is underway to achieve a more completed and sophisticated BOB for less money. Each Command is correlating its own data base.

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(3) A survey of DoD intelligence production indicated three areas requiring significant improvement. Order of Battle was regarded as not sufficiently timely but is now being alleviated by ADP. There is a need for more area intelligence but fulfillment of this requirement is limited by capability. The content of counterinsurgency studies were regarded as inadequate, but the revised Paramilitary Studies and the revised SIS unit on Subversion and Insurgency is expected to fill the gap.

(4) DIA plans eventually to produce a worldwide DoD Intelligence Production Index to provide a single reference document for military users. It will be produced semi-annually and, unlike CIA's IPI, it will be cumulative.

(5) STRICOM made a plea for more DoD production of "anticipatory" intelligence on political, social and economic matters -- "since the military has to do the fighting, these important facets should not be left to CIA."

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